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Now the fight: "On the 19th of August, at 2 A.M., latitude, by her reckoning, 4.0 20' north, longitude 55 west, standing by the wind on the starboard tack under easy sail, with her head about west-south- west, the Guerriere discovered a sail on her weather-beam. This was the Constitution; who, after her escape from the Guerriere and her consorts on the morning of the 19th of July, finding herself cut off from New York, had proceeded to Boston ; where she arrived on the 26th. On the 2nd of August, Captain Hull again set sail, and stood to the eastward, in the hope of falling in with the British 38-gun frigate Spartan, Captain Edward Pelham Brenton, reported to be cruising in that direc- tion. Having run along the coast as far as the bay of Fundy without discovering the object of her pursuit, the Constitution proceeded off Halifax and Cape Sable, and then steered to the eastward in the direction of Newfoundland. Passing close to the isle of Sable, the American frigate took a station off the gulf of St. Lawrence, near Cape Pace, for the purpose of inter- cepting vessels bound to, or from Quebec and New Brunswick. On the 15th, Captain Hull captured, and on account of their small value burnt, two merchant-brigs and a bark ; and on the 17th recaptured from the British ship-sloop Avenger, the American brig Adeline, on board of which he placed a prize- master and six or seven men, to take her to Boston. Having received intelligence that the squadron which, by a display of so much skill and perseverance, the Constitution had already once evaded, was off the Grand Bank, Captain Hull changed his cruising-ground, and stood to the southward. On the 18th, at midnight, an American privateer gave information that she had the day before seen a British ship-of-war to the southward. The Constitution immediately made sail in that direction ; and, in the course of a few hours, Captain Hull found he had not been misinformed. The Guerriere, when she arrived on the North-American station, was armed the same as the other frigates of her class, with 46 guns, including 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines on her quarter-deck and forecastle. Like most French ships, the Guerriere sailed very much by the head; and, to assist in giving her that trim, as well as to obviate the inconvenience of a round-house which intervened between the foremost and bridle ports on each side, and prevented the gun stationed at the former port from being shifted to the latter when required to be used in chase, two additional 18-pounders, as standing bow-chase guns, were taken on board at Halifax; thus giving the Guerriere 48 guns, including 30 long 18-pounders on the main deck. The mere fact, that, for any use they could be in either broadside, these bow guns might as well have been in the hold, is not the principal point cleared up by the explanation. Those who are aware, that no frigate in the British navy, except the Acasta and Lavinia, and none at all belonging to the French navy, mounts as her esta- blishment 30 long 18-pounders on the main deck, would have a right to consider the Guerriere as a frigate of a superior class and description ; and so, for that very reason, is she still gene- rally considered, as well on this as on the opposite side of the Atlantic. We are surprised that neither of our contemporaries, both of whom have given proofs that the first edition of this work has been occasionally consulted by them, has thought it worth his while to point out so important a peculiarity in the Guerriere's armament. 1 We have already, at some length, shown how particular the Americans were in manning tkeir ships ; and how easy, having so few ships to man, it was to supply them with picked crews. For many years previous to the war, America had been decoy- ing the men from British ships, by every artful stratagem. No ship that anchored in her waters could send a boat on shore without having the crew assailed by a recruiting party from some American frigate fitting in the vicinity. Many British seamen had also entered on board American merchant-vessels ; and the numerous non-intercourse and embargo bills, in existence at different periods during the four years preceding the war, threw many merchant sailors out of employment. So that the captains of the American frigates, when preparing for active warfare, had to pick their complements from a numerous body of seamen. Highly to the credit of the naval administration of the United States, the crews of their ships were taught the practical rules of gunnery; and ten shot, with the necessary powder, were allowed to be expended in play, to make one hit in earnest. distinct from the American seamen, so called, were the American marines. They were chiefly made up of natives of the country ; and a deserter from the British would here have been no acquisition. In the United States, every man may hunt or shoot among the wild animals of the forest. The young- peasant, or back-woodman, carries a rifled-barrel gun, the moment he can lift one to his shoulder ; and woe to the duck or deer that attempts to pass him, within fair range of his piece. To collect these expert marksmen, when of a proper age, officers were sent into the western parts of the Union ; and, to embody and finish drilling them, a marine-barrack was established near Washington : from which depot the American ships were regu- larly supplied. With respect to a British ship-of-war, her case was widely different. Although the captain was eased of much of his trouble, by having, in proportion to the size and mounted force of his ship, a considerably smaller crew to collect, by having about one-twentieth part of that crew to form of boys and widows' men, or men of straw, and by being permitted to enter a large proportion of landsmen, a rating unknown on board an American ship-of-war ; still was the small remainder most difficult to be procured, even with all the latitude allowed in respect to age, size, and nautical experience. Sometimes when a captain, by dint of extraordinary exertions, had provided himself with a crew, such as a man-of-war's crew ought to be, the admiral on the station to which he belonged would pro- nounce the ship " too well manned," and order a proportion of her best men to be draughted on board the flag-ship at her moorings, to learn to be idle and worthless : sending, in lieu of them, a parcel of jail-birds and raw hands, to make those among whom they were going nearly as bad as themselves. There was another point in which the generality of British crews, as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient ; skill in the art of gunnery. While the American sea- men were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year ; and some ships could be named, on board of which not a shot had been fired in this way for upwards of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's : the instructions, under which he was bound to act, forbade him to use, during the first six months after the ship had received her armament, more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of her upper-deck guns ; and, after those six months had expired, he was to use only half the quantity. Considering by this, either that the lords of the admiralty discouraged firing at marks as a lavish expenditure of powder and shot, or that the limits they had thus set to the exercise of that branch of naval discipline destroyed its practical utility, many captains never put a shot in the guns until an enemy appeared : they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails, and in decorating the ship. Others, again, caring little about an order that placed their professional characters in jeopardy, exercised the crew repeatedly in firing at marks; leaving the gunner to account, in the best manner he could, for the deficiency in his stores. As the generality of French crews were equally inexperienced with their British opponents, the unskilfulness of the latter in gunnery was not felt or remarked : we shall now have to adduce some instances, in quick succession, that will clearly show how much the British navy at length suffered by having relaxed in its attention to that most essential point in the business of war, the proper use of the weapons by which it was to be waged. That our opinion on this subject is in perfect accordance with what was the opinion of a British officer of the first rank and distinction, will appear by the following quotation from the work of a contemporary: "The Earl of St. Vincent," says Captain Brenton, " in a letter to the author in 1813, thus ex- presses himself, ' I hear the exercise of the great gun is laid aside, and is succeeded by a foolish frippery and useless orna- ment.' How far this may have been the case," proceeds Cap- tain B., " in the Mediterranean, or East or West Indies, with ships of the line, we shall not say ; but certainly on the coast of North America it was not so, the ships on that station being kept constantly in exercise under the daily expectation of a war." 1 Notwithstanding this to us wholly unexpected dissent on the part of Captain Brenton from an opinion given by Earl St. Yincent, we shall consider the latter to be the highest authority on the subject ; especially as the former, in including the Mediterranean among the stations on which ships of the line were neglected to be exercised, has overlooked the very strict and commendable attention paid to that important branch of discipline by Vice-admiral Sir Edward Pellew. We have already given the best account which the imperfect state of the American records has enabled us to give of the con- struction, size, and established armament of the three American 44-gun frigates. We have now to notice a slight alteration, that was afterwards made in the armament of the Constitution. In the summer of 1811, when that frigate was fitting for sea at Norfolk, Virginia, Captain Hull considered that her upper-works would not strain so much as they had been found to do if her 42-pounder carronades were exchanged for 32s. This he got effected ; and on or about the 31st of July the Constitution sailed for Cherbourg, with those guns and a reduced crew of 380 men on board. On the 6th or 7th of September the Consti- tution reached her destination, and in a month or two afterwards returned to her anchorage at Norfolk. Having discovered that 380 men, even in peaceable times, were not enough for so large and heavily-rigged a ship as the Constitution, Captain Hull, during his stay in the Chesapeake, enlisted as many more as restored his complement to 476. But, finding probably that the removal of six tons from the Consti- tution's upper battery afforded the ship great relief in a heavy sea, Captain Hull did not take back his 42-pounders. He con- trived, however, to reduce the inequality of force by opening a port in the centre of the gangway for one of the two 24-pounders on the upper-deck ; or rather, as to be precise we should desig- nate them, the two English long 18-pounders (battery-guns, we believe), bored to carry a 24-pound shot. We formerly noticed the extraordinary size and weight of the Constitution's main- deck 24-pounders. It appears that the guns were mounted on very high carriages, which the height of the deck, represented to be nearly eight feet, rendered no inconvenience. The height of the President's midship main-deck port-sill from the water's edge was eight feet eight inches, and she is described as the lowest ship of the three. This goes far to reconcile the statement we have often heard made, that the Constitution's main deck battery was upwards of 10 feet from the water ; a height which, at a long distance, gave her a decided advantage in the range. It is a remarkable fact, that no one act of the little navy of the United States had been at all calculated to gain the respect of the British. First was seen the Chesapeake allowing herself to be beaten, with impunity, by a British ship only nominally superior to her. Then the huge frigate President attacks, and fights for upwards of half an hour, the British sloop Little Belt. And, even since the war, the same President, at the head of a squadron, makes a bungling business of chasing the Belvidera. While, therefore, a feeling towards America, bordering on con- tempt, had unhappily possessed the miBd of the British naval officer, rendering him more than usually careless and opiniative. the American naval officer, baring been taught to regard his new foe with a portion of dread, sailed forth to meet him with the whole of his energies roused. A moment's reflection taught him, that the honour of his country was now in his hands ; and what in the breast of man could be a stronger incitement to extraordinary exertions ? Thus situated were the navies of the two countries, when, with damaged masts, a reduced comple- ment, and in absolute need of that thorough refit for which she was then, after a very long cruise, speeding to Halifax, the Guerriere encountered the Constitution, 17 days only from port, manned with a full complement, and in all respects fitted for war. It was, as we have already stated, about 2 P.M. that the Guerriere, standing by the wind on the starboard tack, under topsails, foresail, jib, and spanker, with the wind blowing fresh from the north-west, discovered the Constitution bearing down towards her. At 3 P.M. each ship made out the other to be an enemy's man-of-war: and at 3h. 30m. each discovered, with tolerable precision, the force that was about to be opposed to her. At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the Guerriere laid her maintopsail to the mast, to enable the Constitution the more quickly to close. The latter, then about three miles distant, shortened sail to double-reefed topsails, and went to quarters. At 4h. 45 in. P.M. the Guerriere hoisted one English ensign at the peak, another at the mizentopgallantmast-head, and a union-jack at the fore ; and, at 4h. 50m. P.M., 1 opened her starboard broadside at the Constitution. The Guerriere then filled, wore, and, on coming round on the larboard tack, fired her larboard guns, " her shot," says Captain Hull, "falling short;" a proof, either that the Guerriere' s people knew not the range of their guns, or that the powder they were using was of an inferior quality : both causes, indeed, might have co-operated in producing the discreditable result. At 5 h. 5 m. P.M., having run up one American ensign at the peak, lashed another to the larboard mizen rigging, and hoisted a third flag at the foretopgallantmast-head, the Constitution opened her fire ; and, it is believed, none of her shot fell short. To avoid being raked, the Guerriere wore three or four times; and continued discharging her alternate broadsides, with about as little effect, owing to her constant change, of position and the necessary alteration in the level of her guns, as when her shot fell short. After the Constitution had amused herself in this 1 In noticing the time, we shall generally, as on former occasions, take the mean of the two statements. vay for half an hour, she set her maintopgallantsail, and in five minutes, or at about 5 h. 45 m. P.M., 1 brought the Guerriere to close action on the larboard 2 beam ; both ships steering with the wind on the larboard quarter. At 6 h. 5 m. P.M. a 24-pound shot struck the Guerriere's mizenmast and carried it away by the board. It fell over the starboard quarter, knocked a large hole in the counter, and, by dragging in the water, brought the ship up in the wind, although her helm was kept hard a-port. By this accident to her opponent, who had then sustained only a very slight loss, the Constitution would have ranged ahead ; but, bearing up, she quickly placed herself in an admirable position on the Guerriere's larboard bow. Now the American riflemen in the Constitution's tops had an opportunity of co- operating with their friends on deck ; and a sweeping and most destructive fire of great guns and small-arms was opened upon the British frigate, whose bow- guns were all she could bring to bear in return. At 6 h. 15 m. P.M. the two ships fell on board each other, the Guerriere's bowsprit getting foul of the Constitution's starboard mizen rigging. The crew of the latter now prepared to board the Guerriere ; but, in addition to the impracticability of the attempt owing to the motion of the ships, a slight pause was created by the fall of some of the American leaders : a shot from a British marine brought down the first-lieutenant of malices while leading forward his party ; another well-directed musket- shot passed through the body of the first-lieutenant of the ship while at the head of the boarding seamen ; and a third shot entered the shoulder of the master, as he was standing near Lieutenant Morris. The riflemen in the Constitution's tops, in the mean time, continued their unerring fire. Among those who suffered on the occasion was Captain Dacres himself, by a ball fired from the enemy's mizentop, which inflicted a severe wound in his back, while he was standing on the starboard forecastle hammocks, animating his crew. Although suffering greatly, he would not quit the deck. At about the same moment the master was shot through the knee, and a master's mate (Samuel Grant) was wounded very severely. In a few minutes the two ships got clear. Having disentangled her bowsprit from her opponent's mizen rigging, the Guerriere now came to a little, and was enabled to bring a few of her foremost guns on the star- board side to bear. Some of the wads from these set fire to the Constitution's cabin, but the flames were soon extinguished. The i See diagram at p. 379. 2 " Starboard," by mistake, in t le Gazette account 1812. Guerriere's "bowsprit, at that moment striking the taffrail of the Constitution, slacked the fore-stay of the Guerriere, and, the fore-shrouds on the larboard or weather side being mostly shot away, the mast fell over on the starboard side, crossing the main- stay : the sudden jerk carried the mainmast along with it, leaving the Guerriere a defenceless wreck, rolling her main-deck guns in the water." "At about 6 h. 23 m. 2 the Constitution ranged ahead : and the Guerriere soon began clearing away the wreck of her masts, to be ready to renew the action. Just, however, as she had suc- ceeded in doing so, her spritsail-yard, upon which she had set a sail to endeavour to get before the wind, was carried away. The Guerriere now lay an unmanageable hulk in the trough of the sea, rolling her main-deck guns under water : to secure which required increased eiforts, the rotten state of the breech- ings, as well as of the timber-heads through which the long- bolts passed, having caused many of them to break loose. While the British frigate was in this state, the Constitution, at 6 h. 45 m. P.M., having rove new braces, wore round and took a position within pistol-shot on her starboard quarter. It being utterly in vain to contend any longer, the Guerriere fired a lee- gun, and hauled down the union-jack from the stump of her mizenmast. The following diagram will show the progress of this action, from the time the tw r o ships closed to the moment of the Guerriere's surrender. Much to his credit, the moment the Constitution hoisted her colours, Captain Dacres ordered seven Americans, that belonged to his reduced crew, to go below : one accidentally remained at his gun, the remainder went where they had been ordered. This just left 244 men and 19 boys. Out of this number, the Guerriere had her second -lieutenant (Henry Ready), 11 seamen, and three marines killed, her captain (severely), first-lieutenant (Bartholomew Kent, slightly), master (Robert Scott), two master's mates (Samuel Grant and William John Snow), one midshipman (James Enslie), 43 seamen, 13 marines, and one boy wounded; total, 15 killed and 63 wounded, six of the latter mortally, 39 severely, and 18 slightly. Out of her 468 men and boys, the Constitution, according to Captain Hull's statement, had one lieutenant of marines (William S. Bush) and six seamen killed, her first-lieutenant (Charles Morris, dangerously), master (John C. Alwyn, slightly), four seamen (three of them dangerously), and one marine wounded ; total, seven killed and seven wounded. But several of the Guerriere' s officers counted 13 wounded ; of whom three died after ampu- tation. An equal number of killed and wounded, as stated in the American return, scarcely ever occurs, except in cases of explosion. In the British service, every wounded man, although merely scratched, reports himself to the surgeon, that he may get his smart-money, a pecuniary allowance so named. No such regulation exists in the American service; consequently the return of loss sustained in action by an American ship, as far as respects the wounded at least, is made subservient to the views of the commander and his government. Although Captain Hull does not give his prize any guns at all, no other American account gives the Guerriere less than 49 guns. It is true that, besides the 48 guns already specified, the ship had an 18-pounder launch carronade, mounted upon the usual elevating carriage for firing at the tops ; but the priming- iron, when put into the touch-hole just before the action com- menced, broke short off and spiked the gun. In this state it was found by the captors. Consequently, as the two bow 18-pounders were equally useless, the Guerriere, out of her 49 guns, could employ in broadside only 23. We have already shown that the American 44-gun frigate, without making any use of her concealed gangway ports, could present 28 carriage- guns in broadside ; but the Constitution could and did, as we now verily believe, present one gun more. 1 Of the fact of one of her two upper-deck 24-pounders being stationed on the forecastle and the other on the quarter-deck, we have not a doubt, from the following entry in the log of the Constitution when she was pursued by the British off New York, and was about to open a fire from her stern-chasers, " Got the forecastle gun aft." But the disparity in her action with the Guerriere is sufficiently great without adding this gun to the Constitution's broadside : we shall therefore, as in common cases, take no more than half the mounted number. As it would be not only unjust, but absurd, to compare together the totals of two crews of men and boys, in a case where each opponent uses the latter in so very different a pro- portion as the British and the Americans, we shall, making an ample allowance for those in the American crew, exclude the boys altogether from the estimate. This action affords a strong practical proof of the advantages possessed by a large and lofty ship. While the main deck of the Guerriere was all afloat with the roughness of the sea, the Constitution's main deck was perfectly dry. If that was the case before the fall of the Guerriere's masts had destroyed her stability, what .must it have been afterwards ? It is this con- sideration that renders the tonnage so important an item in any statement of comparative force. The relative scantling is another essential point, for which the one-third disparity in size between these figures will partly allow. By an unfortunate typo- graphical (as we take it) error, Captain Brenton represents the Constitution as " an American frigate of the same force as tlie President, though inferior (superior ?) as to scantling." 1 Now. the extraordinary thickness and solidity of the Constitution's sides had long obtained her, among the people who best knew her, the name of " Old Ironsides." We have already shown that the President, an acknowledged lighter ship, possessed stouter sides than a British 74 : we may therefore consider, that the topsides of the Constitution were at least equal in thickness to the topsides of a British 80. With respect to the advantages of stout scantling, we are willing to take the opinion of the Americans themselves. A letter from Mr. Paul Hamilton, the secretary of the American navy, written a few months after the Guerriere's capture, and addressed to the " Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives," contains the following paragraph : " A 76 is built of heavier timber, is intrinsically much stronger than a frigate in all her works, and can sustain battering much longer, and with less injury. A shot which would sink a frigate might be received by a 76 with but little injury : it might pass between wind and water through a frigate, when it would stick in the frame of a 76." Nor is this merely the opinion of Mr. Secretary Hamilton : it is the result of " a very valuable communication received from Charles Stewart, Esq., a captain in the navy of the United States, an officer of great observation, distinguished talents, and very extensive profes- sional experience ; in whose opinion," adds Mr. H , "I believe all the most enlightened officers in our service concur." By a singular coincidence, too, subjoined to this highly-complimented officer's communication to Mr. Hamilton, are the signatures of Captain Hull and his first-lieutenant to a brief but comprehensive sentence of approval: " We agree with Captain Stewart in the above statement in all its parts." 1 We have before remarked upon the great care and expense bestowed by the Americans in equipping their few ships-of-war. As one important instance may be adduced, the substitution of fine sheet-lead for cartridges, instead of flannel or paper. This gives a decided advantage in action, an advantage almost equal to one gun in three ; for, as a sheet-lead cartridge will hardly ever leave a particle of itself behind, there is no neces- sity to sponge the gun, and very seldom any to worm it : opera- tions that, with paper or flannel cartridges, must be attended to every time the gun is fired. The advantage of quick firing no one can dispute, any more than, from the explanation just given, the facility with which it can be practised by means of the sheet-lead cartridge. The principal objection against the use of this kind of cartridge in the British navy is its expense; another may be, that it causes the powder to get damp. The last objection is obviated by filling no more cartridges than will serve for present use ; and, should more be wanted, the Ame- ricans have always spare hands enough to fill them. Although, in the American accounts of actions, no other description of cannon-shot is ever named as used on board their ships than "round and grape," it is now so well known as scarcely to need repetition, that the Americans were greatly indebted for their success over the British to a practice of dis- charging, in the first two or three broadsides, chain, bar, and every other species of dismantling shot, in order to cut away the enemy's rigging, and facilitate the fall of his masts. As an additional means of clearing the decks of British ships of the (seldom over numerous) men upon them, the carronades, when close action commenced, were filled with jagged pieces of iron and copper, rusty nails, and other "langridge" of that descrip- tion. Of the riflemen in the tops we have already spoken ; but even the remaining musketry-men of the crew were provided in a novel and murderous manner : every cartridge they fired con- tained three or four buck-shot, it being rightly judged, that a buck-shot, well placed, would send a man from his quarters as well as the heaviest ball in use. We mention these circum- stances not to dwell for a moment upon their unfairness, but merely to show the extraordinary means to which the Americans resorted, for the purpose of enabling them to cope with the British at sea." "Even this statement, with the one-third disparity in guns, and nearly two-fold disparity in men, which it exhibits, will not convey a clear idea of the real inequality of force that existed between the Guerriere and Constitution, without allowance is made for the ineffective state in which the former commenced the action. There is one circumstance, also, which has greatly contributed to mislead the judgment of the public in deciding upon the merits of this and its succeeding fellow-actions : a belief, grounded on the official accounts, that British frigates of the Guerriere's class had frequently captured French frigates carrying 24-pounders on the main deck. But, in truth, the Forte is the only 24-pounder French frigate captured by a British 38-gun frigate ; and the Forte, in point of force, and readiness for action, was not to be compared with the Constitu- tion. 1 That even French 18-pounder frigates were not, in com- mon cases, captured by British frigates of the same class, with- out some hard fighting, and a good deal of blood spilt on both sides, these pages afford many proofs. Upon the whole, there- fore, no reasonable man can now be surprised at the result of the action between the Guerriere and Constitution. Nor was there in the conduct of the Guerriere, throughout the engage- ment, anything that could militate, in the slightest degree, against the long-maintained character of British seamen. With respect to Captain Dacres, he evinced a great share of personal bravery on the trying occasion; and we confess ourselves to have been amon^ the number of those who did not recollect that, although the Guerriere had made herself very obnoxious to the Americans, it was before Captain Dacres was appointed to her. The chief cause of quarrel between the Americans and the Guerriere undoubtedly arose while Captain Pechell commanded her ; but still it was the same ship, or, to those who doubted that fact, a ship of the same name, which Captain Hull had cap- tured. Most desirable, therefore, would the Guerriere have been as a trophy ; but the shattered state of her hull precluded the possibility of getting the ship into port. At daylight, on the day succeeding the action, the American prize-master hailed the Constitution, to say that the Guerriere had four feet water in the hold, and was in a sinking condition. Quickly the prisoners were removed out of her ; and at 3 h. 30 m. P.M., having been set on fire by Captain Hull's order, the Guerriere blew up. Having by the evening repaired her principal damages, includ- ing a few wounds in each of her three masts, the Constitution made sail from the spot of her achievement, and on the 30th anchored in the harbour of Boston. As may well be conceived, Captain Hull and his officers and crew were greeted with ap- plause by their native and adopted countrymen. He and they also received, at a subsequent day, the thanks of the govern- ment, accompanied by a present of 50,000 dollars. It is a singular fact, that in the letter published in the " Na- tional Intelligencer," as that transmitted by Captain Hull to his government, not a word appears respecting the force of the ship which the Constitution had captured. Captain Hull's letter is in this respect an anomaly of the kind. Perhaps, as the Ameri- can newspapers had frequently stated, that the Constitution mounted 56 guns, and as dead ships, like dead men, " tell no tales," Captain Hull thought it better to leave his friends and countrymen to form their opinion, relative to the force and size of his prize, out of the following sentence: " So fine a ship as the Guerriere, commanded by an able and experienced officer." If Captain Hull did practise this ruse (and the men of Connecti- cut are proverbially shrewd), the effect, as we shall presently see, must almost have exceeded his hopes. When the British says to an American officer, " Our frigates and yours are not a match," the latter very properly replies : "You did not think so once." But what does this amount to ? Admitting that the force of the American 44-gun frigate was fully known before the Guerriere's action, but which was only partially the case ; and admitting that the British 38-gun frigate was considered able to fight her, all that can be said is, that many, who once thought otherwise, are now convinced, that an American and a British ship, in relative force as three to two, are not equally matched. The facts are the same : it is the opinion only that has changed. Man the Constitution with 470 Turks or Algerines ; and even then she would hardly be pro- nounced, now that her force is known, a match for the Guer- riere. The truth is, the name " frigate " had imposed upon the public ; and to that, and that only, must be attributed the angry repinings of many of the British journalists at the capture of the Guerriere. They, sitting safe at their desks, would have sent her and every soul on board to the bottom, with colours flying, because her antagonist was a "frigate;" whereas, had the Constitution been called "a 50-gun ship," a defence only half as honourable as the Guerriere's would have gained for her officers and crew universal applause. Captain Hull, and the officers and men of the Constitution, deserve much credit for what they did do ; first, for attacking a British frigate at all, and next, for conquering one a third infe- rior in force. It was not for them to reject the reward presented by the " Senate and House of Eepresentatives of the United States," because it expressed to be, for capturing a frigate (now for the effect of Captain Hull's "fine ship Guerriere "), " mount- ing 54 carriage-guns," instead of, with two standing bow-chasers and a boat-carronade included, 49. Smiling in their sleeves at the credulity of the donors, the captain and his people, with- out disputing the terms, pocketed the dollars. But is a writer, who stands pledged to deal impartially between nation and nation, to forbear exposing this trickery, because it may suit the Americans to invent any falsehoods, no matter how bare- faced, to foist a valiant character upon themselves ? The author of the American " Naval History," Mr. Clark, remarks thus upon the Guerriere's capture : " It has manifested the genuine worth of the American tar, and that the vigorous co-operation of the country is all he requires, to enable him to meet, even under disadvantageous circumstances, and to derive glory from the encounter, with the naval heroes of a nation Avhich has so long ruled the waves." 1 But was it really " Ame- rican tars " that conquered the Guerriere ? Let us investigate, as far as we are able, this loudly-asserted claim. Our contem- porary says, "It appeared in evidence on the court-martial, that there were many Englishmen on board the Constitution, and these were leading men, or captains of guns. The officers of the Guerriere knew some of them personally, and one man in particular, who had been captain of the forecastle in the Eurydice, a British frigate, then recently come from England. Another was in the Achille at Trafalgar ; and the third-lieute- nant of the Constitution, whose name was Reed, was an Irishman. It was said, and we have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were 200 British seamen on board the Constitution when she began the action." 1 One fellow, who after the action was sitting under the half-deck busily employed in making buck-shot cart- ridges to mangle his honourable countrymen, had served under Mr. Kent, the first-lieutenant. He now went by a new name; but, on seeing his old commanding-officer standing before him, a glow of shame overspread his countenance. In the latter end of the year 1816 a work issued from the Washington press, entitled, "A Register oi' Officers and Agents, Civil, Military, and Naval, in the Service of the United States, &c. Prepared at the Department of State, by a resolution of Con- gress." Affixed to the list of names in this official document, is one column headed " State or Country where Born." Turning to this column in the " Navy Department," we find that, out of the 32 captains, one only, " Thomas Tingey/' has "England" marked as his birthplace. There was another, we know ; but he had died about a twelvemonth before, Captain Smith of the Congress. Three blanks occur; and we consider it rather creditable to Captains "John Shaw," "Daniel T. Patterson," and "John Orde Creighton," that they were ashamed to tell where they were born. Of the 22 masters commandant, one only appears to have been born out of the United States, and that is " George C. Piead," of "Ireland ;" the same, no doubt, mentioned by Captain Brenton, as the third-lieutenant of the Constitution in A.ugust, 1812. Of the 160 lieutenants, there appear to be only five born out of the United States ; of which five, "Walter Stewart," "William Finch," and "Benjamin Page, jun.," are stated to be of "England," and "James Ramage," of " Ireland." To 17 names, all English and Irish, appears no bir thplace. We shall pass over the surgeons, their mates^ the pursers, chaplains, and midshipmen ; among whom we find, besides a few blanks, only eight of England and Ireland. As we descend in the list, the blanks in the column of " Country where born " increase surprisingly. Now, as the native Ameri- can seaman usually carries about him his certificate of citizen- ship ; and, as scarcely any man is to be found who, if he can speak at all, cannot answer the question, " Where were you born ?" we must consider that the birthplace is purposely omitted, because, being a native of Great Britain or Ireland, and probably a deserter from the British navy, the fellow is ashamed or afraid to avow it. Hence, out of the 83 sailing-masters, we find eight born in England, Scotland, Ireland, and Bermuda, and 15 without any birthplace assigned to them. Among the 20 boat- swains, one is stated to have been born in England, four in the United States, and the rest nowhere. Of the 2o gunners, three appear to have been born in the United States, one in Germany, another in Portugal, and the remaining four-fifths in some name- less country. Of the 18 carpenters, 11 sail-makers, and four master's mates, 33 in all, five only have been p,ble or willing to enable the Washington state-clerk to fill up the important blanks. Can any one, after the analysis we have given of this curious American state-document, entertain a doubt that, during the late war between Great Britain and the Uuited States, one third in number, and nearly one-half in point of effectiveness, of the sea- men that fought in the ships of the latter were bred on the soil, and educated in the ships of the former? This may appear very discreditable to British seamen, considered as a body; but it should be recollected, that the total of the seamen belonging to the American ships-of-war formed only a small portion of those employed in the British navy. Moreover, a large proportion of the deserters and renegades that entered the service of the United States, were Irish Eoman Catholics. It is for this reason that an American captain can sometimes assert, with no great degree of untruth, that he has a few "Englishmen" among his crew. There were, it appeal's, on board the Constitution, so many men whom the crew of the Guerriere considered as their country- men, so many who felt, as well they might feel, some degree of compunction at their fallen state, that Captain Hull was afraid the two bodies united would overpower him and his Americans, arid carry the Constitution to Halifax. He very naturally, and very properly, we think, "kept his prisoners* manacled and chained to the deck during the night, and the greater part of the day." 1 One reason for doing this, might be to render more allur- ing the offer of liberty made to those who would turn traitors. Being perfectly aware, that all the British whom they could persuade to enter, would fight in the most desperate manner rather than be taken and turned over to their certain and merited fate, Captain Hull and his officers, as well while the Constitution was steering for Boston, as after she had arrived there, used every art to inveigle the late Guerriere's crew to enlist in the American service. Eight Englishmen, however, were all that remained in the United States ; and only two of those entered on board the Constitution. On the 2nd of the succeeding October, a court-martial assem- bled on board the Africa 64, Halifax harbour, to try the captain, officers, and late crew of the Guerriere ; when, as may be antici- pated from the details already given, the following sentence of acquittal was pronounced: "Having attended to the whole of the evidence, and also to the defence of Captain Dacres, the court agreed, that the surrender of the Guerriere was proper in order to preserve the lives of her valuable remaining crew ; and that her being in that lamentable situation was from the acci- dent of her masts going, which was occasioned more by their defective state than from the fire of the enemy, though so greatly superior in guns and men. The court do, therefore, unanimously and honourably acquit the said Captain Dacres, the officers and crew, of his majesty's late ship the Guerriere, and they are here- by honourably acquitted accordingly. The court, at the same time, feel themselves called upon to express the high sense they entertain of the conduct of the ship's company in general, when prisoners, but more particularly of those who withstood the attempts made to shake their loyalty, by offering them high bribes to enter into the land and sea-service of the enemy, and they will represent their merit to the commander-in-chief." In his official letter, dated at Boston, September 7, Captain Dacres compliments Captain Hull and his officers, for their treatment of his men, "the greatest care being taken to prevent them losing the smallest trifle." But, considering perhaps that, in an enemy's country, it would be unwise to commit complaints or the chance of leading to further oppression, Captain Dacres remained silent about the attempts to inveigle his crew, until ho addressed the members of his court-martial at Halifax. The concluding passage of that address is in the following words : " Notwithstanding the unlucky issue of this affair, such con- fidence have I in the exertions of the officers and men who be- longed to the Guerriere ; and I am so well aware that the success of my opponent was owing to fortune, that it is my earnest wish, and would be the happiest period of my life, to be once more opposed to the Constitution, with them under my com- mand, in a frigate of similar force to the Guerriere." That the captain of the Guerriere should have expressed such an opinion on such an occasion is allowable enough ; but we are surprised to find that opinion seconded by the captain of the Spartan, a frigate of the same force as the Guerriere, a frigate which the Constitution herself had just come from seeking when she fell in with the latter. " Thus far," says Captain Brenton, "the two ships had fought with an equal chance of success, when the day was decided by one of those accidents to which ships-of-war are ever liable, and which can be rarely guarded against." 1 He then describes the fall of the Guerriere's mizen- mast. We are stopped, however, in the comments we were going to make, by observing, at the conclusion of the account of the Guerriere's capture, the following paragraph, whether in confirmation or contradiction of the former passage, let others decide : " The inference is erroneous (that our navy was declin- ing and our officers and men deficient in their duty), founded on a supposition, that, if two ships happen to be called frigates, the lesser one, being manned and commanded by Englishmen, ought to take the greater, though a ship very nearly double her force, in size, guns, and men : we need scarcely enter into any argument to prove the fallacy of such an expectation."

William James' Naval History of Great Britain, Vol. 5, 1823, again. First, the famous chase of the Constitution by Philip Broke's squadron: "On the 9th, in latitude 41, longitude 66 or nearly abreast of Nan- tucket island, the squadron was joined by the 38-gun frigate Guerriere, Captain James Eichard Dacres, then on her way to Halifax to refit. When it is known, that the Guerriere had nearly expended, not only her water and provisions, but her boatswain's and car- penter's stores that her gunner's stores were also deficient that what remained of her powder, from damp and long keep- ing, was greatly reduced in strength that her bowsprit was badly sprung, her mainmast, from having been struck by light- ning, in a tottering state, and her hull, from age and length of ser- vice, scarcely seaworthy no one will deny that this rencounter with a squadron, the commodore of which had orders to supply her with three months' provisions and take her under his com- mand, was rather unfortunate ; in fact, such was the state of general decay in which the Guerriere at this time was, that, had the frigate gone into Portsmouth or Plymouth, she would, in all probability, have been disarmed and broken up. On the 14th, when arrived off Sandy Hook, Captain Broke received the first intelligence of the squadron of Commodore Rodgers having put to sea ; and, as may be supposed, a sharp look-out began immediately to be kept by each of the British ships. On the 16th, at 3 P.M., when the British squadron was abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues off shore, a strange sail was seen, and immediately chased, in the south by east or wind- ward quarter, standing to the north-east. This sail was the United States 44-gun frigate Constitution, Captain Isaac Hull, from Chesapeake bay since the 12th, bound to New York. The chase continued throughout the afternoon and evening, in light winds ; and at 10 P.M. the Guerriere, who since dusk had lost sight of her consorts to leeward, found the Constitution standing towards her, making signals. These two frigates continued to near each other, and at 3h. 30m. A.M. on the 17th were only half a mile apart ; when, observing on his lee beam two other frigates, the Belvidera and J^olus, and astern of them three more vessels, the Shannon, Africa, and a schooner, none of whom answered or appeared to understand his signals, Captain Dacres concluded that they were the squadron of Commodore Eodgers, and tacked. The consequence of this mistake was, that at day- light the Guerriere and Constitution were nearly two miles in- stead of only half a mile from each other. At daylight it was quite calm. The Constitution, while she steered, kept her head to the southward. At this time the Belvidera was about four miles on her lee-quarter, or bearing about north-east by north ; the Guerriere at some distance astern of the Belvidera ; the Shannon upon the latter's weather-quarter, or about west-north-west, distant two miles ; and the jiEolus at no great distance from the Shannon. The Africa was consi- derably astern of these two ships, and gradually losing ground in the chase. At 5 h. 30 m. A.M., the Constitution no longer steering, the boats were sent ahead to tow the ship's head to the southward. At the same time a 24-pounder was hoisted up from the main deck ; and that and the forecastle 24-pounder were got aft to be used, along with the quarter-deck 24-pounder,* as stern-chasers. The taffrail was then cut away, to give the three guns room, and two more 24-pounders were pointed through the stern ports on the main deck. At about 5 h. 45 m. the Belvidera and other British ships began towing with their boats. At 6 A.M. the Constitution got her head to the south- ward, and set topgallant studding-sails and staysails. At 7 A.M., having a few minutes before sounded in 26 fathoms, Captain Hull, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Charles Morris, first of the ship, got out a kedge, and began warping ahead. At 7 h. 30 m. the Constitution hoisted her colours, and fired one shot at the Belvidera. At 9 A.M. a light air sprang up from the south-south-east, and the ships all trimmed sails on the larboard tack. The Bel- videra gaining, the Constitution started a portion of her water, and threw overboard some of her booms. At 10 h. 30 m. the breeze freshened ; but, in a few minutes, again subsided to nearly a calm. Observing the benefit that the Constitution had derived from warping, Captain Byron did the same; "bending all his hawsers to one another, and working two kedge anchors at the same time, by paying the warp through one hawse-hole as it was run in through another opposite." The effect of this was such, that the Belvidera, by 2 P.M., got near enough to exchange bow and stern chasers with the Constitution, but without efiect on either side. At 3 P.M., a light breeze having sprung up, the Constitution rather gained, and the firing ceased. During the afternoon and night the chase continued, to the gradual advantage of the American frigate. On the 18th, at daylight, the Constitution bore from the Bel- videra south-west distant four miles, and the Shannon bore from the latter north-east distant six miles. At 4 h. A.M. the Belvidera tacked to the eastward, with a light air from the south by east ; and at 4 h. 20 m. the Constitution did the same. At 9 A.M. an American merchant-ship was seen bearing down towards the squadron ; upon which the Belvidera, by way of a decoy, hoisted American colours. To counteract the effect of this ruse, the Constitution hoisted English colours, and the merchant-vessel hauled off and escaped capture. At 4 P.M., owing to the permanency of the breeze, the Constitution was seven miles ahead, and at daylight on the 19th had attained double that distance. The British squadron persevered until about 8h. 30m. A.M. ; then gave up the chase, and stood to the northward and eastward ; latitude at noon the same day 38 north, and longitude 71 20' west. On the 29th of July, in latitude 40 44', longitude 62 41', Captain Broke fell in with the expected homeward-bound Jamaica fleet, consisting of about 60 sail, under convoy of the 38-gun frigate Thetis, Captain William Henry Byam ; and on the 6th of August, having escorted it over the banks of New- foundland, to about latitude 43 20', longitude 50, he stood back towards the American coast. On this or the following day the Guerriere parted company for Halifax, to obtain that refit which could now no longer be postponed. Indeed, the ship was in a far less effective state than when she had joined the squadron, having sent away in prizes her third-lieutenant (John Pullman), second-lieutenant of marines, three midship- men, and 24 of her best seamen ; thus leaving herself with only 250 men and 19 boys." Again, please excuse the scanning errors.

I pulled the following quotes out for those interested in HMS Java, the Constitution's second most famous opponent: "The guns of the Amelia (late French Proserpine) were the same as those mounted by the Java, with an additional pair of 32-pounder carronades, or 48 guns in all. The guns of the Arethuse were the same, in number and caliber, as the Java mounted when captured as the French Renommee ... The Arethuse was the sister-frigate of the Renommee : consequently the tonnage of the Java will suffice. "

Yes, James wrote of it extensively! Glad someone is interested! " On the 25th of November, 1812, the two new French 40-gun frigates Arethuse, Commodore Pierre-Fran^ois-Henry-Etienne Uouvet, and Eubis, Captain Louis- Frangois Ollivier, sailed from Nantes on a cruise. In January these two frigates, accompa- nied by a Portuguese prize-ship, the Serra, steered for the coast of Africa, and on the 27th, when off Tamara, one of the Isles de Los, the Eubis, who was ahead, discovered and chased a brig, which was the British gun-brig Daring, Lieutenant William E. Pascoe. The latter, when at a great distance, taking the Eubis for an English frigate, sent his master in a boat to board her. On approaching near, the boat discovered her mistake and en- deavoured to make off, but was captured. The Daring was now aware of her perilous situation, and crowded sail for Tamara, followed by the Eubis ; whom the lightness of the breeze de- layed so much, that the brig succeeded in running on shore and her crew in setting her on fire. The two French frigates, at 6 P.M., came to an anchor in the road of Isle de Los. Here Captain Bouvet learnt, that Sierra Leone was the rendezvous of two British frigates and several sloops-of-war ; that one of the former had recently quitted the coast, and that the remaining frigate, reported to him as larger and stronger than either of his own, still lay at anchor in the river. In the course of six days, the French commodore refitted his chips, and supplied them with water and provisions for six months. Having also sent to Sierra Leone to exchange the few prisoners in his possession, consisting, besides the boat's crew of the Daring, of the master and crew of a merchantman he had taken, Captain Bouvet, on the 4th, weighed and made sail with his two frigates. At 4 P.M. the Arethuse, who was ahead, struck on a coral bank, but forcing all sail, got off immediately, with no greater damage than the loss of her rudder. The two frigates then re-anchored, but driving in a gale of wind, were obliged, at 3 A.M. on the 5th, to get under sail ; the Arethuse contriving a temporary rudder while her own was repairing. At daylight, when the gale had abated, the Arethuse found herself lying becalmed within four leagues north-east of 'the island of Tamara; and Captain Bouvet was surprised to dis- cover his consort still among the islands, covered with signals, which the distance precluded him from making out, but which were judged to be of melancholy presage. At 8 A.M. the Are- thuse anchored in 12 fathoms. At 11 A.M. the Rubis was ob- served to fire several guns, and at noon to have the signal flying, that the pumps were insufficient to free her. Captain Bouvet immediately sent his longboat with two pumps; but at 2 A.M. on the 6th the officer returned, with information that the Eubis had struck on the rocks, and that her crew were removing to the Portuguese ship. At daylight, by which time she had repaired and reshipped her rudder, the Arethuse discovered a large ship to windward. This was the British 38-gun frigate Amelia, Captain the Hon. Frederick Paul Irby, from Sierra Leone. It was at 3 h. 30 m. P.M. on the 29th of January, that Lieu- tenant Pascoe and a part of his crew joined the Amelia, then moored off Free Town, Sierra Leone, bringing information, that he had left " three French frigates " at anchor in Isle de Los road. The Amelia began immediately to bend sails and clear for action, and in the evening was joined by the Hawk mer- chant-schooner, with some more of the Daring's men. On the morning of the 30th the Amelia's launch-carronade was put on board the Hawk, and Lieutenant Pascoe, having volunteered, was despatched in her to reconnoitre the French ships. On the 2nd of February, at noon, Lieutenant Pascoe returned, with intelligence of the names of the two French frigates and their prize ; and also of Captain Bouvet's intention to proceed immediately to sea, to intercept the British homeward-bound trade. On the 3rd, at 8 A.M., the cartel-cutter, noticed as having been despatched by Captain Bouvet, arrived with prisoners, in- cluding the crew of the Daring's boat : and at 10 h. 30 m. the Amelia, with a debilitated crew, for whose recovery she was about to proceed to England, got under way, and made sail, against a west-south-west wind, for the Isles de Los, in the hope of falling in with some British cruiser that might render the match more equal, and prevent the two French frigates from molesting several merchant-vessels that were daily expected at Sierra Leone. On the 5th, at 8 A.M., the Amelia got a sight of Isle do Los : and at 8 P.M., when standing to the north-east, and then distant three leagues west-north-west of Tamara, she observed a strange sail in the north-east, or right ahead, making night- signals. Supposing this vessel to be one of the French frigates, the Amelia tacked to the westward, the wind now blowing fresh from the north-west. On the 6th, at daylight, the Amelia again tacked to the north-east, and at 9 A.M. spoke the Princess Charlotte government-schooner from Sierra Leone, the vessel that had been making signals the preceding night. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M. the French ships were observed in the north- east, at anchor off the north end of Tamara : one, the Arethuse, considerably to the northward of the other, who appeared to be unloading the prize, but was really removing into the latter her own crew. At 10 A.M. Captain Irby despatched the Princess Charlotte to Sierra Leone, with directions for any British ship-of-war that might arrive there to repair imme- diately to him. The Amelia then bore away to Tamara to re- connoitre the enemy. At 2 h. 30 m. P.M. the two French frigates were observed to interchange signals ; and at 3 h. 20m. the Arethuse weighed and made sail on the starboard tack, with a moderate breeze at south-south-west. The Amelia thereupon shortened sail, and hauled to the wind on the same tack as the Arethuse. In a few minutes the latter tacked to the westward, to avoid a shoal, and the Amelia did the same. At 6 P.M. the Arethuse bore from the Amelia north-north-east distant six miles ; at which time the Eubis, as supposed, but probably the Serra, was observed to have her topsails hoisted. At 6 h. 30 m. P.M. the north end of Tamara bore from the Amelia east- south-east distant five leagues. At 8 P.M. the Amelia lost sight of the Arethuse ; and at 8 h. 30 in., in order to keep oft' shore during the night, Captain Irby tacked to the south-south-west, with the wind from the westward. At 6 h. 45 m. A.M. on the 7th the Amelia discovered the Arethuse about eight miles off in the south-east ; but a calm, which came on at 8 A.M., kept both frigates stationary. At noon a light breeze sprang up from the west-north-west : where- upon the Arethuse stood towards the Amelia, on the larboard tack, under all sail ; the latter making sail also, in the hope to draw the Arethuse from her consort, still supposed to be in a condition to follow and assist her. At 5 P.M., finding the wind beginning to fall, and conceiving that he had drawn the Arethuse to a sufficient distance from her consort, Captain Irby shortened sail, wore round, and, running tmder his three topsails with the wind on the starboard-quarter, steered to pass, and then to cross the stern of, the Arethuse ; who was standing, under the same sail, close hauled on the lar- board tack. To avoid being thus raked, Captain Bouvet. at 7 h. 20 m. P.M., tacked to the south-west, and hoisted his colours ; as the Amelia previously had hers. It was now a fine moonlight night, with the wind very moderate, and the sea nearly as smooth as a millporid. At 7 h. 45 m. P.M., just as the Amelia had arrived within pistol-shot upon her starboard or weather-bow, the Arethuse opened her fire, which was imme- diately returned. After about three broadsides had been ex- changed, the maintopsail of the Amelia, in consequence of the braces having been shot away, fell aback. Owing to this acci- dent, instead of crossing her opponent as she intended, the Amelia fell on board of her ; the jib-boom of the Arethuse carrying away the Amelia's jib and stay, and the French ship's bumpkin or anchor-fluke, part of the British ship's larboard forecastle barricade. The Arethuse now opened a heavy fire of musketry from her tops and mast-heads, and threw several hand-grenades upon the Amelia's decks, hoping, in the confusion caused by such com- bustibles, to succeed in an attempt to board ; for which purpose several of the Arethuse' s men had stationed themselves in her fore-rigging. A man was now seen on the spritsail-yard of the Arethuse, making strenuous efforts to get on board the Amelia. Scarcely had the poor fellow called out, "For God's sake, don't fire, I am not armed !" when a musket-ball from a British marine dropped him in the water. It was afterwards ascertained, that one of the crew of the Arethuse, a Ham- burgher, had formerly belonged to the Amelia, having been taken out of one of her prizes on the coast of Spain, and forced to enter on board the French frigate. It appears that the man was so desirous to get back to his ship, that he requested a settler at the Isle de Los to secrete him till an opportunity offered of his reaching Sierra Leone. The probability therefore is, that the rnan so shot, while upon the spritsail-yard of the Arethuse, was the unfortunate Hamburgher. Finding that, owing in a great degree to the steady and well- directed fire kept up by the Amelia's marines, her object could not be accomplished, the Arethuse threw all aback and dropped clear. In doing this, her spritsail-yard knocked Lieutenant William Eeeve, who had been invalided from the Kangaroo sloop, from the break of the forecastle into the waist. Setting her maintopgallant and middle staysails (her jib for the time being disabled), the Amelia endeavoured again to get her head towards the bow of the Arethuse. The Amelia at length did so, but, in attempting a second time to cross her antagonist, a second time fell on board of her ; and the two ships now swang close alongside, the muzzles of their guns almost touching. This was at about 9 h. 15 m. P.M., and a scene of great mutual slaughter ensued. The two crews snatched the spunges out of each other's hands through the portholes, and cut at one another with the broadsword. The Amelia's men now attempted to lash the two frigates together, but were unable, on account of the heavy fire of musketry kept up from the Arethuse's decks and tops, a fire that soon nearly cleared the Amelia's quarter-deck of both officers and men. Among those who fell on the occasion were the first and second lieutenants (John James Bates and John Pope), and a lieutenant of marines. Captain Irby was also severely wounded, and obliged to leave the deck to the command of the third-lieutenant, George Wells; who, shortly afterwards, was killed at his post, and Mr. Anthony De Mayne, the master, took the command. The mutual concussion of the guns at length forced the two frigates apart ; and, in the almost calm state of the weather, they gradually receded from each other, with, however, their broad- sides still mutually bearing, until 11 h. 20 m. P.M. ; when both combatants, being out of gun-shot, ceased firing. Each cap- tain thus describes this crisis. Captain Irby says: "When she (the Arethuse) bore up, having the advantage of being able to do so, leaving us in an ungovernable state, &c." Captain J5ouvet says : "At eleven o'clock the fire ceased on both sides ; \ve were no longer within fair gun-shot, and the enemy, crowding sail, abandoned to us the field of battle." " A onze lieures, le feu cessa de part et d'autre ; nous n'etions plus a bonne port^e, et 1'ermemi se coiivrit de voiles, nous abandonnant le champ de battaille." 1 The damages of the Amelia, although, chiefly on account of the smooth state of the sea, they did not include a single fallen spar, were very serious ; the frigate's masts and yards being all badly wounded, her rigging of every sort cut to pieces, and her hull much shattered. But her loss of men will best show how much the Amelia had suffered. Of her proper crew of 265 men, and 30 (including, as if 18 were not already enough, 12 esta- blished supernumerary) boys, and her 54 supernumerary men and boys, composed chiefly of the Daring's crew, the Amelia and her three lieutenants (already named), second-lieutenant of marines (Robert G. Grainger), Lieutenant Pascoe, late com- mander of the Daring, one midshipman (Charles Kennicott), the purser of the Thais (John Bogue, of his second wound), 29 sea- men, seven marines, and three boys killed, her captain (severely). Lieutenant Reeve, invalided from the Kangaroo sloop, the master (already named), first-lieutenant of marines (John Simpson), purser (John Collman), boatswain (John Parkinson, dangerously), one master's mate (Edward Eobinson), four mid- shipmen (George Albert Rix, Thomas D. Buckle, George Thomas Gooch, and Arthur Beever), 56 seamen (two mortally), 25 marines (three mortally), and three boys wounded ; total, 51 killed and died of their wounds, and 90 wounded, dangerously, severely, and slightly. The Arethuse, as well as her opponent, left off action with her masts standing ; but they were all more or less wounded, and her rigging was much cut. Her hull must also have suf- fered considerably ; as her acknowledged loss, out of a crew, including the boat's crew of the Rubis, of at least 340 men and boys, amounted to 31 killed, including 11 of her officers, and 74 wounded, including nearly the whole of her remaining officers. The guns of the Amelia (late French Proserpine) were the same as those mounted by the Java, with an additional pair of 32-pounder carronades, or 48 guns in all. The guns of the Arethuse were the same, in number and caliber, as the Java mounted when captured as the French Renommee. 2 Although 1 Mon. April 29. An English translator " We were no longer in good condition. ' of Captain Bouvet's letter has rendered See Naval Chronicle, vol. xxfx., p. 385, " Nous nations plus a bonne porte'e " by 2 See vol. v., p. 290. the total of men and boys on board the Amelia would be 349, yet, it" we are to allow for the number of her men that were unable to attend their quarters, and for the feeble state of many of the remainder, among whom, including the Daring's, there were nearly 40 boys, 300 will be an ample allowance. The Arethuse has been represented to have had a crew of 375 or 380 men. but we do not believe she had a man more of her proper crew than 330 ; making, with the boat's crew of the Eubis, 340. The Arethuse was the sister-frigate of the Renommee : consequently the tonnage of the Java will suffice. Here was a long and bloody action between two (taking guns and men together) nearly equal opponents, which gave a victory to neither. Each combatant withdrew exhausted from the fight ; and each, as is usual in the few cases of drawn battles that have occurred, claimed the merit of having forced the other to the measure. But it must now be clear, from the Amelia's damaged state, that Captain Bouvet was mistaken when he said, that she crowded sail to get away ; it is much more probable, as requiring no other effort than shifting the helm, that the Arethuse, as Captain Irby states, bore up. Viewing the relative effectiveness of the two crews, one de- bilitated by sickness, the other, as admitted, in the full vigour of health ; considering that, although both frigates sustained an almost unparalleled loss of officers, the captain of one of them only was obliged to give up the command: considering, also, the difference in the numerical loss, 141 and 105, a difference mainly attributable, no doubt, to the fatigued state of the Amelia's crew at the latter part of the action ; we should say, that the Arethuse, had she persevered, or could she, being to leeward, have done so, would, in all probability, have taken the British frigate. In saying this, we are far from placing every French 40-gun frigate upon a par with the Arethuse ; she was excellently manned, and was commanded by one of the best officers in the French navy. The chief part of the crew of the Arethuse may, it is true, have been conscripts, but then they were conscripts of the year 1807, and were under an officer capable, if any officer was so, of making them good seamen. With respect to Captain Irby, his critical situation, without reference to the state of his crew, must not be overlooked. The Amelia commenced, gallantly commenced, the action, under the impression that another French frigate, also equal in force to herself, was, although out of sight, at no great distance off. If, then, there was a probability of the approach of the Eubis when the action began, how must that probability have been heightened after the action had lasted three hours and a half, both ships remaining nearly stationary the whole time, and the wind, when it afterwards sprang up, drawing from the east- ward, the direction in which the Eubis had been last seen? In addition to all this, the Amelia had on board a considerable quantity of gold dust, belonging to merchants in England. Upon the whole, therefore, both frigates behaved most bravely ; and, although he had no trophy to show, each captain did more to support the character of his nation than many an officer who has been decorated with the chaplet of victory. Previously to quitting the action of the Amelia and Arethuse, we would request the boasters in the United States of America to compare the execution here done by an 18-pounder French frigate, with the best performance of one of their huge 24-pounder frigates : bearing in mind, that it was done against an opponent, not only equal to herself in force, but equally able to manoeuvre by the possession of her masts ; that it was done in a fair side- to-side action, neither frigate, during the three hours and a half's engagement, having had an opportunity to give one raking fire. It will, no doubt, also strike Commodores Decatur and Bainbridge, that, so far from constantly evading the close assaults of his antagonists, Captain Bouvet remained nearly in the same position from the commencement of the battle to its termination. Both frigates found ample employment, during the remainder of the night, in clearing the decks of the dead and wounded, and in securing their damaged masts. At daylight on the Sth they were about five miles apart, the Arethuse to the eastward of the Amelia, and both nearly becalmed. On a light breeze springing up, the Amelia, having bent a new foresail and fore- topsail, made sail before it to the southward, on her way to Madeira and England ; and the Arethuse stood back to Isle de Los, to see what had become of Captain Ollivier and his people On the morning of the 10th the Arethuse was joined by the Serra, with the late crew of the Rubis, stated then to consist of 300 men. Taking half the number on board his frigate, Captain Eouvet, with the Serra in tow, steered for France. On reaching the latitude of Madeira, however, Captain Bouvet removed every man out of the Serra, and destroyed her, as she retarded the Arethuse in her voyage. On the 18th of March, in latitude 33 30* north, longitude 40 west, the French frigate fell in with and boarded the Mercury and another cartel, having on board the surviving officers and crew of the late British frigate Java ; and on the 19th of April, after having made in the whole about 15 prizes, the Arethuse anchored in St. Malo ; as on the 22nd of the preceding month had the Amelia at Spithead. Another pair of French 40-gun frigates had been nearly the same route as the Arethuse and Eubis, but, during a two months and a half s cruise, had not encountered a single hostile vessel-of-war. The Hortense and Elbe, Captains Pierre-Nicolas Lahalle and Jules Desrostours, sailed from Bordeaux on the 7th of December, 1812 ; and steering for the coast of Africa, anchored on the 4th of January between the Bissagot islands, a little to the northward of Sierra Leone. They sailed soon after- wards, cruised a short time off the Azores, and on the 15th of February succeeded in entering Brest.

Curiously, the profile of Nelson's command at The Battle of the Nile is used by the Vanguard Insurance Group. Go figger ...

No. I assume we are talking about Nelson's two commands. Agamemnon was a 64 gun ship, while Vanguard was a 74 gun ship.

Here's another 1814 frigate-fight between the fir-built 24-pounder HMS Eurotas (HMS Shannon sister-ship) and the French 18-pounder Chlorinde. From the same above source: " It is uncertain on what day, previous to the capture of the Ceres, her consort, the Clorinde, parted company ; but we find the latter on the 25th of February, in latitude 47 40' north, longitude (from Greenwich) 9 J 30' west, on her way to Brest, after a tolerably successful cruise. It was at 2 P.M., when standing close hauled on the starboard tack, with the wind at south-west by south, that the Clorinde was descried by the British 24-pounder 38-gun frigate Eurotas, Captain John Philli- more, then on the former's weather-beam steering by the wind on the larboard tack. The Eurotas quickly bore up in chase ; and at 2h. 30 m. P.M. the Clorinde, whose national character and force was by this time ascertained, also bore up, under a press of sail. While the chase is going on, we will proceed to point out some peculiarities in the armament of one of these ships, a knowledge of which will be necessary to render fully intelligible the details we have to give of the action fought between them. At the commencement of the year 1813, under the head of " British and American Navies," we stated that, among the means taken to meet the large American frigates on equal terms, some of the British 38-gun class were mounted with medium 24-pounclcrs, and allowed an increased complement of men. The first two frigates so fitted were the Cydnus and Eurotas, both built of red pine and recently launched. The Cydnus was fitted with the 24-pounder of General Blomefield, measuring 7 ft. 6 in., and weighing about 40 cwt. ; and the Eurotas, after having, by mistake we believe, received on board a set of long or 49 cwt. 24s, was fitted with the 24-pounder of Colonel Congreve, measuring only 7 ft. G in., and intended to weigh 41 cwt. 1 qr. 12 Ibs., but actually weighing only 40 cwt. 2 qrs. 21 Ibs. With 28 of these guns on the main deck, 16 carronades, 32-pounders, two long nines, and the usual 18-pounder launch- earronade, on the quarter-deck an4 forecastle, as her regular establishment, and with, we are inclined to think, one additional 24-pounder upon General Blomefield's principle, the Eurotas, commanded by Captain John Phillimore (promoted from the Diadem troop-ship, which he had commanded since June, 1810), sailed from the Nore in the middle of the month of August, bound off Brest. On the 30th the Eurotas joined" the blockading squadron, which was under the command of Commodore Pulteney Malcolm, in the 100-gun ship Queen Charlotte, Captain Eobert Jackson. On some day in September (we believe the 14th) Captain Phillimore invited the commodore and all the captains of the squadron on board the Eurotas to witness a trial of her 24-pounders. The guns were tried eight times, with the full allow- ance of powder, and double-shotted ; and they stood remarkably well. Commodore Malcolm said he should like to have Colonel Congreve's 24-pounders on the Queen Charlotte's second and third decks ; and every one of the captains went away pleased with the gun. The following captains, with the exception of one or two, but which we cannot say, Avere present at this successful trial of the guns of the Eurotas : Captains AVilloughby Thomas Lake, Eobert Lambert, Thomas Elphinstone, Sir Michael Sey- mour, Henry Yansittart, George M'Kinley, George Tobin, George Harris, and Eobert Jackson. Captain Phillimore sub- sequently declared that, if well manned, he could light both sides of the Eurotas with ease ; was delighted with the guns in a gale of wind ; and found that, when the Eurotas was carrying a press of sail off Ushant, the guns did not work in the least, nor the ship seem to feel the smallest inconvenience from them. 1 On the 25th of November the Eurotas sent six of her 24-poundcrs on board the Cydnus, and received in exchange the same number of the latter's guns ; but on the 5th of the ensuing February, when the two ships again met, the Eurotas received back her six 24s, and returned to the -Cydnus those belonging to her. We must now show what ensued between the Eurotas and the French frigate Clorinde ; whose force, it may be necessary to state, was 28 long 18-pounders, 14 carronades, 24-pounders, and two long 8-pounders, total 44 guns. At 4 P.M. the wind shifted to the north-west and fell consi- derably ; but the Eurotas, nevertheless, gained in the chase. At about the same time the Clorinde, then not quite four miles distant in the east-north-east, suddenly shortened sail, and endeavoured to cross the hawse of her pursuer. This only 1 For a copy of & Icttei from Captain Phillimore, stating most of these particulars, see Appendix, No. 4. hastened the junction ; and at 4 h. 45 m. the Eurotas fired a shot and hoisted her colours, as did also the Clorinde. At 5 P.M., having bore up, the Eurotas passed under the stern of the Clorinde and discharged her starboard broadside. Then, luffing up under the Clorinde's quarter, the British frigate received so close and well-directed a fire, that in the course oi 20 minutes, and just as she had reached the larboard bow of her antagonist, her mizenmast fell by the board over the starboard quarter ; and, nearly at the same time, came down the fore-top- mast of the Clorinde. The French frigate now, shooting ahead, endeavoured to cross the bows of the Eurotas, with the intention of raking her. To evade this, and at the same time lay her antagonist on board, the Eurotas put her helm hard a-port and luffed up ; but, being obstructed in her manoeuvre by the wreck of the mizenmast, she could only pass close under the stern of the Clorinde, and pour in her larboard broadside. The two frigates again got side by side, and cannonaded each other with redoubled fury. At 6h. 20m. P.M. the Eurotas, then close on her opponent's starboard beam, had her mainmast shot away ; and which, fortunately for her, fell over the starboard or unengaged quarter. Almost at the same instant the mizenmast of the Clorinde came down. At 6h. 50m., the two ships being nearly in the same relative position, the foremast of the Eurotas fell over the starboard bow .; and in a minute or two afterwards the mainmast of the Clorinde shared the same iate. The Eurotas was now quite, and the Clorinde almost, unmanageable. At 7 h. 10 m. P.M., being then on the larboard bow of the Eurotas, the Clorinde set the remains of her foresail and her fore staysail and stood to the south-east, out of gun-shot. Captain Phillimorc, who since the early part of the action had been dangerously wounded in the shoulder by a grape-shot (the loss of blood from which, according to a published state- ment, 1 had caused him to faint three times on deck), now con- sented to go below ; and the command of the Eurotas devolved upon Lieutenant Eobert Smith. The boats' masts were imme- diately stepped on the booms, and the sails set, to endeavour, with a light westerly breeze, to keep after the enemy, still in the south- east. The wreck of the masts were also cleared away, and preparations made for getting up jury-masts ; and in the mean- while the ship laboured much, owing to her dismasted siate and a heavy swell from the westward I Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi., p. 184. By great exertions throughout the night, the Eurotas, at 5 A.M. on the 26th, got up a spare maintopmast for a jury mainmast and at 6 h. 15 m., a foretopmast for a jury foremast, and a rough spar for a inizenmast ; the Clorinde still preserving the same line of bearing as on the preceding evening, but having increased her distance to nearly six miles. At 11 h. 30 m. A.M. Lieute- nant Smith spoke the English merchant-schooner Dungarvon, from Lisbon bound to Port Glasgow, and requested her master to keep between the Eurotas and Clorinde, and, in the event of the Eurotas not overtaking the Clorinde before night, to show a light and fire guns. At noon the Eurotas and Clorinde were about eight miles apart ; but in so different a state with respect to ability to renew the action, that while the latter had only partially cleared away the wreck of her main and mizen masts, the former had jury-courses, topsails, staysails, and spanker set, going with a northerly wind, six and a half knots through the water, and evidently gaining in the chase. But at this moment, Captain Phillimore justly observes, "to the great mortification of every one on board " the Eurotas, two sail were descried on the lee bow. The nearest of these was the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Dryad, Captain Edward Galwey ; the other the 16-gun brig-sloop Achates, Captain Isaac Hawkins Morrison. At 1 h. 15 m. P.M. the Clorinde hoisted French colours aft and English forward, and despatched a boat to the Dryad, who then shortened sail and hove to to receive it. The purport of Captain Denis-Lagarde's communi- cation, as it has appeared in print, was to require terms before he would surrender. The doubt expressed by the French officers as to the ship in sight to windward being that which had reduced the Clorinde to such a state, was far from unreasonable ; consi- dering that, not only had a night intervened, but the ship now seen was masted, rigged and under sail, where the ship engaged the evening before had been left as bare as a hulk. The French lieutenant was quickly sent back to the Clorinde. to get ready her " resources," and the Dryad filled and stood towards her, to give her an opportunity of trying the eifect of them. At 1 h. 35 m. P.M., having placed herself on the Clorinde's quarter, the Dryad fired one shot into her ; when the French frigate hauled down her colours, and was taken immediate possession of. At this time the Eurotas was between four and five miles off to windward, and the Achates about the same distance from the Clorinde to leeward. Out of a complement on board of 329 men and boys, the Eurotas had two midshipmen (Jeremiah Spurking and Charles Greenway), one first-class volunteer (John T. Vaughan), 13 seamen, four marines, and one boy killed, her commander (very severely), one lieutenant of marines (Henry Foord), one midship- man (John R. Brigstock), 30 seamen, and six marines wounded ; total, 21 killed and 39 wounded. Out of a crew on board num- bering, according to the depositions of Captain Denis-Lagarde and his two principal officers, 344 men and boys, the Clorinde had 30 officers and men killed and 40 wounded. From the great proportion of killed, it is probable that the severely wounded only are here reckoned. They may have amounted to 20 more ; making the killed 30, and the wounded 60. In the letter which Captain Galwey, with a proper feeling, permitted Captain Phillimore to write, the latter states, that the Clorinde had "a complement of 360 picked men," and that " M. Gerrard," one of the French officers, calculated their loss at 120 men. With respect to the complement, judging by the number of men usually found on board frigates of the Clorinde's class, and allowing, if necessary, that some may have been absent in prizes, we consider the sworn amount, 344, and that for which the head-money was afterwards paid, as likely to be the most correct. In regard to the alleged declaration of " M. Gerrard," unless the slightly wounded were in a very unusual proportion, the statement extracted from the Dryad's log is more to be depended upon ; especially, as it specifies both killed and wounded, and accords exactly, as we shall proceed to show, with the number and distribution of the prisoners. Owing to there being three British men-of-war in company, it is natural to suppose that all the prisoners would be taken out of the French ship, with the exception of the badly wounded. Accord- ingly, out of the 314 assumed survivors of the French crew, the Dryad received on board 125, the Eurotas 92, and the Achates 57 ; leaving on board the Clorinde, by a singular coincidence, the exact number stated by the French officers as the amount of their wounded. Every one of those officers, not left in the Clorinde, appears to have been on board the Dryad ; among whom we find Captain Denis-Lagarde, M. Joseph Lemaitre, his first, and M. Yincent Moulac, his second lieutenant ; but we do not see in the list the name of " Gerrard," nor any name re- sembling it. This person, therefore, was probably one of the wounded left on board the Clorinde. Although we are by no means satisfied that the Eurotas did not mount one of General Blomefield's 24-pounders in addition to her established armament already particularized, we shall not include that gun, nor, of course, the 18-pounder launch carro- nade, in the following Comparative Force of the Combatants. Broadside-guns . Had the Eurotas been armed the same as the generality of her class, this would have been a remarkably fair match ; but the British ship's 24-pounders destroyed the equilibrium. Yet, with a distance which would even have suited carronades, and with the exclusive advantage of two raking fires, those 24- pounders did not do so much execution, in proportion to the time they were acting, as had been done on many other occa- sions by an equal number of 18s. The ship, it is true, had not been quite 10 months in commission, and had not had her guns on board many days over six months ; but even the shorter of those two periods was long enough for the men to have been taught as much of practical gunnery as should have enabled them, in a close action of nearly two hours with an inferior antagonist, to have done greater execution, in reference to what they themselves suffered, than appears to have been inflicted by the Eurotas upon the Clorinde. But, deficient as the crew of the Eurotas may have been at their guns, they were by no means so at the various other duties of their calling. The quickness with which the seamen refitted their ship was as great a proof of their spirit as it was of their skill ; and, contrasted with the evidently unprepared state of the Clorinde, 18 hours after the battle, showed, in a very clear manner, the superiority of a British over a French crew. It was the capability to go ahead and manoeuvre, thus given, that would again, in a short time, have brought the Eurotas alongside of the Clorinde ; and it was a perfect readi- ness to renew the action, with, owing to the preceding day's two hours' practice at the guns, an actual increase of power, that would have made the Clorinde the prize of the Eurotas, even had the Dryad not interposed her unwelcome presence. The arrival of the Dryad and Achates, although it certainly robbed the Eurotas of her trophy, went a very little way towards dignifying the surrender of the Clorinde ; who, notwithstanding her captain's previous threat, did not fire a shot in return for the one discharged at her by the Dryad. We formerly expressed a belief, that the Achates alone would have produced the same result ; but, much as was to be expected from the tried gallantry of the brig's commander, we now, looking at the number of unwounded prisoners received out of the Clorinde, and the impunity with which her principal officers escaped, think other- wise. Nor do we feel disposed to award so much credit to M. Denis-Lagarde as we formerly did ; not only because of the tarneness of his surrender, but because, with so many officers and men in an effective state, he ought, in the 18 hours that had elapsed, to have cleared away his wreck, and partially refitted his ship. The dismasted state of the Eurotas, and her serious loss in men, prove that the French crew knew in what way to handle their guns; and considering how long the Clorinde had been in commission, and how many months of the time at sea, 1 we must suppose that her men were competent to perform the other duties of men-of-war's men, had their officers issued the proper directions. A\ r ith good management, therefore, the Clo- rinde might have effected her escape before the Dryad and Achates fell in with her ; and, even had 'the prevailing westerly wind begun to blow strong, soon after the close of the action, and lasted through the night, the probability is, that the French frigate, unrefitted as she was, would still have gained a port of France. Taking the prize in tow, the Dryad proceeded with her to Portsmouth ; and the Clorinde was afterwards added to the British navy by the name of Aurora, a Clorinde (also a French frigate) being already in the service. For his gallantry in this action, and his unremitting exertions in getting the ship cleared, masted, and under sail in so short a space of time, Lieutenant Robert Smith, first of the Eurotas, was deservedly promoted to the rank of commander. A litigation afterwards took place on the subject of the head-money for the crew of the Clorinde ; and it was at length decreed to the Dryad, as having been the actual captor. With the exception of the particulars entered into respecting the guns of the Eurotas, and respecting the state of the prisoners received out of the Clorinde, the above account of the action between these frigates is essentially, and almost verbally, the game as that given in the preceding edition of this work. The accuracy of that account having been publicly impugned, we i See vol. v., pp. 48, are bound, either to admit that we are misinformed on the subject, or to bring forward such proofs as will place beyond the reach of further contradiction the validity of our statements. As far as we have been able to glean them, the following are the principal, if not the only objections that were raised: 1. That the Eurotas' 24-pounders were experimental guns, and proved, defective in some (but what, we cannot say) particular, when tried in the action. 2. That the crew of the Eurotas had been taught how to fire with precision ; consequently, that the com- paratively slight execution done by the Eurotas to the Clorinde did not arise from the inexpertness of her men, but from the ineffectiveness of her guns. Unfortunately, the newspapers of the day used their endeavours to circulate a much more import- ant objection than either of these ; no less than that the main- deck guns of the Eurotas were 18, and not 24 pounders. Let us hasten to do Captain Phillimore the justice to state, that he never made, although we do not remember that he contradicted, an assertion which could have been so easily refuted. A con- temporary saw the paragraph, and, putting aside the news- paper, kept it until he could give the statement again to the public, with a post-captain's name as a voucher for its accuracy, in the following words : "A frigate-action, of an interesting nature, was fought in February, 1814, between the Eurotas, a British ship, of 44 guns, 18-pounders, and La Clorinde, of the same force." 1 Taking the two serious objections in the order in which they are stated, we shall begin with the quality of the guns. As far as a trial before the action could speak for the Congreve 24-pounders, we have already shown, that Captain Phillimore himself, Commodore Malcolm, and several experienced post- captains, were "delighted with them." Now for their behaviour in the action. The moment we learnt that Captain Phillimore had a complaint to allege against the guns, for some ill quality or deficiency that discovered itself in the action between the Eurotas and Clorinde, we turned again to the official letter. Finding no complaint there, we once more looked into the ship's log ; knowing that there at least a minute of the circumstance ought to have been noted down. Not a word could we discover on the subject. We then took the pains to ascertain, if any official report, complaining of the guns, had reached the navy board. Except an application, made in March, to have the breeching-bolts of the carronades, and the cat-heads of the i Breaton. vol. v, p. Eurotas made different from those of any other ship in the service, and a refusal of both requests, we could find no correspondence between Captain Phillimore and the commissioners of the navy. Pursuing our inquiries, we at last discovered that, on the 15th of March, 1814, an examination took place of the officers of the Eurotas on the very subject on which we desired informa- tion ; and the following (all we have been able to procure) is a transcript of what purports to be the testimony of the second- lieutenant of the Eurotas, Eichard Wilcox Graves : ' ' That, when the said guns were tried at Sheerness against the common 24-pounder long gun, they seemed to carry the shot, both double and single, as far as the latter ; that they bounded a little more than the long gun, but not dangerously so ; that they can be worked with two men less than the common long gun, are easier to train, and embrace a larger range or circle; that, in the action, one bolt only was drawn on the main deck, and one seizing broken, the latter of which might have been badly made , that, upon the main deck, two shot were fired from each gun in the first three rounds, and one round and one grape during the remainder of the action; that .the quantit of gunpowder was 8 lb., which was considered 2 Ib. too much, no difference of range being perceived when the guns were fired with only 6 lb. ; that there is only one gim on board the Eurotas, similar to those on board the Cydnus, upon Lieutenant-general Blomefield's principle, on account of there not being a complete set at Wool- wich when the Eurotas was fitted out." From the time of her action, except to land them when docked to have her damages repaired, the Eurotas retained these same guns, until Captain James Lillicrap paid the ship off on the 6th of January, 1816 ; when the Eurotas landed her " 28 Congreve's 24-pounders " at the arsenal at Woolwich. Conse- quently, there could have been no well-grounded complaint against the guns, otherwise the board of admiralty would not have suffered the Eurotas again to go to sea with them onboard. On the contrary, the lords of the admiralty were so pleased with the report made of the 40 cwt. Congreve 24-pounder, after a series of experiments tried at Sutton Heath, that, in the latter end of the year 1813, they ordered 300 more of the same de- scription of gun to be cast ; and, as a proof that the behaviour of the guns in the action of the Eurotas with the Clorinde, rather confirmed than lessened the previous good opinion entertained of them, the board of admiralty, on the 28th of April, 1815, 1814.] ordered that all the first-rate ships in the British navy should thenceforward be established, upon their upper or third decks, with the Congreve 24-pounder. After this full exposition of the perfect adequacy of the Eurotas' 24-pounders to perform, in a close contest especially, quite as well as any guns of the same caliber, we might answer the second objection, by simply pointing to the execution clone by English 24 and 32, against French 18 and 24 pounders, and vice versa, as unfolded in our detailed account of this action ; but we shall not blink the question : we stated, that the ship's company of the Eurotas had not been sufficiently practised at the guns, and we are prepared to prove our assertion. We must premise that, at the time the Eurotas was commissioned and armed with 24-pounders, three American 24-pounder frigates had recently captured three English 18-pounder frigates, and that with such impunity as to indicate that the art of gunnery had been much neglected in the British navy." Again, please forgive the scanning errors

Taken from Volume 5 of 'The Naval History of Great Britain', by William James. "In the latter end of October, 1813, the two French 40-gun frigates Etoile and Sultane, Captains Pierre-Henri Phillibert and Georges Du-Petit-Thouars, sailed from Nantes on a cruise. On the 18th of January, at 4A.M., latitude about 24 north, longitude (from Greenwich) 53 west, these two French frigates discovered in the north-west the British 24-pounder 40-gun frigate Severn, Captain Joseph Nourse, escorting a convoy from England to the island of Bermuda, and steering west by north, with the wind a light air from the south-east. At 7 h. 30 m. A.M. the Severn proceeded in chase; and at 8 h. 40m., finding the strangers did not answer the private signal, the British frigate bore up north by east, and made all possible sail from them, signalling her convoy to take care of themselves. At 10 h. 30m. A.M. the Severn commenced firing her stern- chasers at the leading enemy's frigate, and at noon lost sight of her convoy steering to the westward. At 4 h. 5 m. P.M. the headmost French frigate, the Etoile, hoisting her colours and broad pendant, began firing her bow-guns. A running fight now ensued, which, without doing the slightest injury to the Severn, lasted until 5 h. 30 m. P.M. ; when the Etoile then distant less than two miles (the Sultane astern of her about one), ceased firing. The chase continued all night, rather to the advantage of the Severn. At 8 A.M on the 19th the two French frigates gave up the pursuit, and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. The Etoile and Sultane afterwards proceeded to the Cape de Yerds, and anchored in the port of English Harbour, island ot Mayo. On the 23rd of January, at about 9 h. 55 m. A.M., the two British 18-pounder 36-gun frigates Creole, Captain George Charles Mackenzie, and Astrea, Captain John Eveleigh rounding the south-east end of Mayo on their way from the neighbouring island of Fort-aventura, with the wind at north-east, 125 blowing fresh, discovered over a point of land the mast-heads of the two French frigates, and of two merchant-ships, one brigan- tine, and one schooner, lying in their company. At 10 h. 15 m. the two British frigates having cleared the point, wore and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, under their topsails. On a supposition that the strangers, whose hulls were now plainly visible, were Portuguese or Spanish frigates, the Creole hoisted the Portuguese, and the Astrea, by signal from her, the Spanish, private signals. No answer being returned, the strange frigates were considered to be enemies ; and at 11 h. 30 m. A.M. the Creole and Astrea wore and made sail for the anchorage in which they lay. At noon, when the two British frigates were about a mile distant from them, the Etoile and Sultane, having previously hoisted their topsail-yards to the mast-head, cut or slipped, and made sail free on the larboard tack, with a strong wind still from the north-east. The two former now set topgallantsails in chase ; and the Astrea, owing to a gust of wind suddenly striking her, had the misfortune to split all three topsails, the mizen- topsail very badly, to replace which a fresh sail was soon got into the top. At about 30 minutes past noon the south-west end of the island of Mayo bore from the Creole, the leading British frigate, east-north-east distant four miles. In another quarter of an hour the Creole, both British frigates having previously hoisted their colours, fired a shot ahead of the sternmost French ship, the Sultane, then on the former's lee or starboard bow. The two French frigates immediately hoisted their colours. The Creole continued firing her bow-guns occasionally at the Sultane until 1 P.M. : when the former discharged a few of her larboard-guns, and then, as she ranged up on the Sultane's lee beam, received the French ship's first broadside. The Astrea also opened her fire in crossing the stern of the Sultane, and then gallantly passed between the latter and the Creole, just as the two ships had exchanged the fourth broad- side. After giving and receiving two broadsides, within pistol- shot, the Astrea, at 2 h. 15 in. P.M., stood on to engage the Etoile, then about half a mile ahead of her consort, with her mizen topsail aback. Having extinguished a fire that had caught in the foretopmast staysail and mizen chains, the Creole, at 2 h. 30 m., recommenced the action with the Sultane, and presently shot away her mizenraast. About this time the wad- ding from the French ship's guns again set the Creole on fire, in the forecastle hammocks and on the booms. The flames were again extinguished, and the action continued for nearly half an hour longer ; making about two hours from its commencement. Having now had every brace and bowline, tack, and sheet shot away, her main stay and several of her shrouds cut through, her three masts, particularly her foremast, badly wounded, the Creole put her helm a-lee, and, steering to the north-west in the direction of the island of St. Jago, abandoned the contest. It took the Astrea, when at 2 h. 15 m., she had quitted the Sultane, until 2 h. 30 m. before she got alongside of the Etoile to leeward. After an exchange of broadsides, the Astrea, having, from the great way upon her, ranged too far ahead, luffed up and raked the Etoile on her starboard bow. The Astrea, just at this moment losing her wheel, fell roundoff ; and the Etoile, Avcaring, passed close astern of her, separating her from the boat she was towing, and poured in a most destructive raking fire; which cut the Astrea's lower rigging to pieces, shot away both deck- transoms and four quarter-deck beams, burst a carronade, and ripped up the quarter-deck in all directions. Backing round, the Astrea soon got her starboard guns to bear; and the two frigates, each with a fresh side opposed to the other, recom- menced the action, yard-arm and yard-arm. In a few minutes Captain Eveleigh fell, mortally wounded by a pistol-shot just below the heart, and was carried below. The command now devolved upon Lieutenant John Bulford ; and the engagement between the Astrea and Etoile continued in this close position, with mutual animation, although it was no cheering sight to the Astrea, at about 3 P.M., to observe her consort, on the starboard tack, apparently a beaten ship, and the Etoile's consort approaching to double the force against herself. At 3 h. 5 m. r.M. the .topsail, which lay in the Astrea's mizen top to replace the split one, caught fire, but the flames were soon extinguished. Seeing the near approach of the Sultane, the Astrea would have boarded the Etoile, and endeavoured to decide the contest that way ; but the motion of the ships was too great, and the British frigate could only continue to keep her antagonist under her guns to leeward. At 3 h'. 30 m. the Sultane, as she passed to leeward, raked the Astrea, and did her considerable damage. In five minutes the Sultane wore from the Astrea, and stood before the wind, leaving the latter and the Etoile still in close action. At 3 h. 45 m. the Etoile also wore round on the starboard tack ; and in five minutes afterwards the Astrea's mizenmagt, with the topsail a second time in flames, went by the board, carrying some of the firemen with it. In a short time after she had wore and ceased firing, the Etoile stood towards her consort, who was waiting for her under easy sail ; and the Astrea, having by this time had the whole of her lower and topsail braces shot away, and being otherwise greatly damaged in rigging and sails, was in too unmanageable a state to follow. At 4 h. 15 m. the Sultane's maintopmast went over the side ; l and the Astrea, having soon afterwards partially refitted herself, wore round on the starboard tack with her head towards San-Jago. At this time the Creole was not visible to the Astrea; and the two French frigates were about four miles distant in the south-west, steering south by west. At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the Creole was discovered under the land, standing into Porto-Praya bay ; where at 4 h. 45 m. she anchored, and where, in about an hour after- wards, the Astrea joined her. The principal damages of the Creole have already been related : her loss, out of a complement of 284 men and boys, amounted to one master's mate, seven seamen, and two marines, killed, and 26 petty officers, seamen and marines wounded. The Astrea, besides the loss of her mizenmast and the damage done to her rigging and sails, had her fore and main masts wounded, and was a good deal struck about the stern and quarter. Her loss, out of the same complement as the Creole's, consisted of her commander and eight seamen and marines killed, and 37 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded, four of them dangerously and 11 severely; making the loss on board the two British frigates 19 killed and 63 wounded. The two remaining masts of the Sultane, and all three masts of the Etoile, were badly wounded : and, that their hulls escaped no better is most likely, because the acknowledged loss on board of each, out of a complement of 340 men and boys, was about 20 men killed and 30 wounded, or 40 killed and 60 wounded be- tween them. Here were two pairs of combatants, about as equally matched, considering the character of the opponent parties, as could well be desired ; and who fought so equally, as to make that a drawn battle, which, under other circumstances, might have ended de- cisively. Had the Creole, having already witnessed the fall of the Sultane's mizenmast, been aware of the tottering state of that 1 The logs of the Creole and Astrea concur in stating it to have been the mainmast that fell, but both ships were mistaken. The frigate's maintopmast, Captain Mackenzie would not, we presume, have discontinued the engagement, simply for the pre- servation of his wounded foremast ; especially when the Creole's main and mizen masts were still standing, as well as all three of her topmasts, and when, by his early retirement, he was exposing to almost certain capture a crippled consort. No frigate could have performed her part more gallantly than the Astrea ; but two such opponents, as the one that had so long been en- gaging her, were more than she could withstand. Fortunately for the Astrea, both French frigates had seemingly had enough of fighting ; and the Etoile and Sultane left their sole antagonist in a state not less of surprise than of joy at her extraordinary escape. "On tho 26th of March, at 9 A.M., these two frigates (the Sultane with jury topmasts and mizenmast), when about 12 leagues to the north-west of the Isle de Bas, steering for Saint Malo, in thick weather, with a moderate breeze at south-west, fell in with the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Hebrus, Captain Edmund Palmer, and 16-gun brig-sloop Sparrow, Captain Francis Erskine Loch. The latter was so near to the French frigates that, in crossing them, she received seven or eight shot from each ; which greatly damaged her rigging and sails, killed her master, and wounded one seaman. The brig now tacked towards the Hebrus, who was on her weather-quarter, standing on the larboard tack. The latter, as she passed the French frigates to windward on the opposite tack, exchanged distant broadsides with them, and fired her weather or larboard guns as a signal to her consort, the 74-gun ship Hannibal, Captain Sir Michael Seymour. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M., the Hebrus again tacked, and in 10 minutes afterwards, on the fog clearing, observed the Hannibal coming down under a press of canvas. At 10 A.M., being joined by the 74, the Hebrus crowded sail after the two French frigates, then bearing from her south-east by east distant about four miles. At 11 A.M. the wind suddenly shifted to the north-north-west, and blew very fresh. On this the two French frigates, finding their pursuers rapidly approaching, separated : the Sultane changed her course to east by north, and the Etoile hauled up to south-east. Directing by signal the Hebrus, as the best sailing-ship, to chase, in company with the Sparrow, the most perfect frigate, the Hannibal herself went in pursuit of the other. At 2 P.M. the Hebrus lost sight of the Hannibal and Sultane, and at 5 P.M. of the Sparrow ; and the Etoile then bore from her south-east by east, distant three miles. Soon afterwards the Etoile gradually hauled up to east-north-east, but was still gained upon by the Hebrus. About midnight the French frigate reached the Bace of Alderney ; when, the wind getting more northerly, the Hebrus came up fast, and took in her studding- sails. At Ih. 35m. A.M. on the 27th, having run the length of Point Jobourg, the Etoile was obliged to attempt rounding it almost within the wash of the breakers. At 1 h. 45 m., while, with her courses hauled up, the Hebrus was following close upor. the larboard quarter of the Etoile as the latter wore round the point, the French frigate opened a fire upon the British frigate's starboard bow. This fire the Hebrus quickly returned within pistol-shot distance, running athwart the stern of the Etoile, to get between her and the shore ; and that so closely, that her jib-boom passed over the French ship's taifrail. The Hebrus was now in eight fathoms water, and the land within musket- shot on her starboard beam. At 2h. 20m. A.M., while crossing the bows of the Hebrus to get again inside of her, the Etoile shot away the British frigate's foretopmast and foreyard, and crippled her mainmast and bowsprit, besides doing considerable injury to her rigging, both standing and running. It had been nearly calm since the commencement of the ac- tion, but at 3 A.M. a light breeze sprang up from the land. Taking advantage of this, the Hebrus succeeded in pouring several raking fires into her antagonist, and at 3h. 45m. shot away her mizenmast by the board. At 4 A.M. the Etoile ceased firing ; and, after a close and obstinate combat of two hours and a quarter, hailed to say that she had struck. No sooner was possession taken of the prize, than it became necessary to turn the heads of both ships off the shore, as well to prevent them from grounding as to get beyond the reach of a battery, which, having been unable in the darkness of the morning to distinguish one frigate from another, had been annoying them both with its fire. The tide fortunately set the ships round Pointe Jobourg, and at 7 A.M. they anchored in Vauville bay, about five miles from the shore. Although the principal damages of the Hebrus were in her masts and rigging, her hull had not wholly escaped, as is evident from her loss ; which, out of a crew of about 284 men and boys, amounted to one midshipman (P. A. Crawley) and 12 seamen killed, and 20 seamen, 2 marines, and three boys wounded ; four of the number dangerously, and six severely. The Etoile's principal damages lay in her hull, which was extremely shattered, leaving her at the close of the action with four feet water in the hold : her loss, in consequence, out of 327 men and boys (including the wounded in the former action), amounted to 40 killed and 73 wounded. The guns of the Hebrus, one of the new yellow-pine frigates, were the same as those of the Belvidera. The Etoile mounted 44 guns, including 14 carronades, 24-pounders, and two 8- pounders on the quarter-deck and forecastle. Of her acknowledged crew of 327, we shall allow 12 for the badly wounded, and not yet recovered, of the action of the 26th of January. As the crew of the Hebrus was quite a new ship's company, with scarcely a single draught from any other ship, while the crew of the Etoile had been formed out of the united ships' companies of the Arethuse and Eubis, and had even since fought a creditable, if not a victorious action with an equal force, a great share of credit is due to Captain Palmer, his officers, and crew, for the successful result of this action ; con- sidering, especially, how near it was fought to the French shore, and how critically circumstanced the Hebrus was, both during its continuance and at its termination. We formerly concluded, that the stock of ammunition on board the Etoile must have been considerably diminished when she fell in with the Hebrus ; but it has since been proved to us, that, after her capture by the latter, the Etoile had a considerable quantity of powder and shot left: consequently we erred in our supposition, and are extremely gratified that the inaccuracy has been pointed out in time to be corrected in these pages. We must not omit to mention, that Captain William Sargent, of the navy, who was a passenger on board the Hebrus during the action, evinced much skill and intrepidity ; as is very handsomely acknowledged by Captain Palmer in his official letter." Note: HMS Hebrus was a fir-built sister ship to HMS Euryalus, identical except for the square-tuck stern

Captain Frederick Maryatt's contemporary sea novels, written by an officer who actually served with Lord Cochrane, the real prototype for Jack Aubrey. They have never been out of print: Peter Simple, Mr. Midshipman Easy, Frank Mildmay, The King's Own, Percival Keene, and many others, written in the 1830's.

One reason that American Revolutionary War privateers might carry decorations, would be to blend in with the rest of the sea traffic. There is nothing more suspicious that a bland, austere ship edging down on you, giving you an early chance to make your escape. So both merchant built conversions like the Oliver Cromwell (ex-Juno) , and purpose built privateer like the Rattlesnake, were richly adorned, just like the average merchantman would be. But by 1812, however, the 'baltimore clippers' were so fast and weatherly, that it didn't much matter. Their rig alone would have given them away. The few surviving plans and paintings show them to be rakish, mostly black, plain and sinister looking. The general naval and private style of that period was to replace full figureheads with busts or fiddleheads, and to substitute the stern figures with scroll work and rope tracery, in the "French Fashion".

Of the six great British luxury four-stackers at sea, or building, in 1912, fully half will have sunk within four years - Titanic in 1912, Britannic in 1916, and Lusitania in 1915. The three survivors were Olympic, Mauritania and Aquitania.

I know of at least one BC, the Siro , that was described as "coppered to the bends". She was designed and built by Thomas Kemp of Baltimore in early 1812 (pre-war) as a French coast blockade runner. She was captured in 1813, but sold out of RN service. Renamed the British letter of marque Atalanta, she was retaken by the USS Wasp in October, 1814, and was noted as being remarkably well built. I would assume that the other Kemp built BC's, like the Grecian and the Lynx, the only two 1812 BC's of which named plans survive, would have been coppered also. Siro was described in one paper as the most expensively built, lavishly equipped private vessel built in Baltimore to date. There is also a surviving contemporary built rigged model of the Schooner privateer Comet, also Thomas Kemp built, which appears to be coppered (green paint). Comet was briefly leased to the US Navy in 1813 because of the high quality of her construction. Kemp was thought to have owned the model. Note. They were never actually called 'baltimore clippers' during the war of 1812. This term first popped up later about the 1830's. They were known as 'Chesapeake Bay Pilot Schooners', or some variation of that, by those who knew them. See Geoffrey Footner's "Tidewater Triumph: The Development and Worldwide Success of the Chesapeake Bay Pilot Schooner", Tidewater Press, Centerville Maryland, 1998. Highly recommend ...

I just want to say that "Rat-fink-a-booboo' is an awesome name!

By the way, that's me singing .... knot.

From the makers of "What does the Fox Say". This video will help with your rigging ...

I'm surprised that there was any surviving, original hull planking above Victory's waterline to get a sample. These ships replaced nearly everything above water every few decades. Nothing above the Constitution's waterline is original. Only her keel, deadwood, floors, and first and second futtocks, and a few other lower chunks, are thought to date back to 1812. The key is that they rebuild the timbers just the way they found them, keeping what the academes call their historical "provenance".

Log of Victory, May 3, 1805: "Dismissed ye carpenter, Jonathan Grey, who had, before having been discovered by the doctor to be completely colour-blind, ordered the ship's sides painted a light pink while the Capt. was away. He had thought it was instead the normal tan-ochre. We cruise against the French tonight without chance of repainting. Landsman Grey sentenced to receive 50 lashes."

Remember, the figurehead shown on the Philadelphia's sail plan is Hercules.

Seems awfully small compared to the first photo's house siding, and the second photo's wall corner wainscoating, to be the center of a large frigate's tafferail ...

No davits on sloops of war during the War-of-1812, at least according to an 1813 letter written by Jacob Jones of the Wasp I, following the battle with the Frolic. He saw an approaching British ship, bow on, which carried davits, and so he ran away because, according to him, davits meant a frigate or a ship-of-the-line. The ship was the 74-gun liner Poictiers, which captured him.

I read somewhere long ago (weasel disclaimer, don't recall) that the Boston's carvings were done by the Skillins family of Boston. There are unidentified sketches of ships' sterns in the Peabody Museum of Salem by Samuel Skillins, according to their catalog. I think the elder Skillins did the Confederacy's carvings ... ?

No, McIntire did the Essex's, and maybe also the Pickering's and the Merrimack's. Its all guess-work at this point, since no one bothered to preserve any carving details, but if you are willing to guess, I think you are probably right about the New York's stern, Charlie. The tafferail of the USS Maryland had the seal of Maryland in the center, if I recall correctly. I would go with the female figure of "Columbia" as a figurehead, since Columbia University is in the city. Use perhaps the figure on Chapelle's draught of the Congress as a guide, since the New York was basically a reduced Congress, according to contemporary sources.

I believe the Naval Historical Center in Washington has Bill's old data files. I don't have Philadelphia's file. I never thought the NA tafferail looked very Rush-like either (not sufficiently detailed), but maybe they sub-ed the job out to a local carver. I wondered if the dimensions of that tafferail survives. I once speculated that maybe the fastenings holes in it, might betray how far apart the counter timbers were, and thus, how many windows she had. I looked at that same engraving of Phillies stern, and I thought I counted seven windows. There is a frame drawing for an unknown 36 gun frigate (14 gun ports aside) in the Fox Papers labeled "proposed deck for Chesapeake", but the plan shows eight counter-timbers (seven windows, not counting the two additional false windows on the back of the galleries), two more than the Chesapeake had, and I wondered if this wasn't the Philadelphia's proposed gun deck plan instead ... Your Essex drawing sounds very McIntire-ish to me. He carved many fireplace mantels in Salem, exactly as you described, but he always replaced the Indian in the State Seal's shield with an eagle ... and put him instead on the Essex's bow.

Hal !!! OMG!!! I'm glad you're alive - and well - and still modeling! I tried looking for you online a while back, but came up empty. I wondered if you had retired to Hawaii, or somewhere equally special. I tell people all the time that there is this guy on long Island who is scratch-building the entire Federal Navy in 1/8th scale! Your models of Johnston Blakeley's early ships really made my book something truly special. Thanks again, Brother!

Captain Jack Aubrey would often cry, "Clew up! Clew up!", during a battle.